JPA Sahel Intelligence — INTSUM Issue 11 | JNIM Expansion, Critical Minerals & Corporate Risk | March 2026

SSCI CRITICAL — JNIM besieging Bamako, cutting fuel. 9,362 deaths in Sahel 2025. Mali lithium and Niger uranium under insurgent pressure. US minerals diplomacy active. JPA weekly Sahel corporate intelligence. Week ending 22 March 2026.

NORTH AFRICA & SAHEL

JPA Structural Analysis Unit

3/22/20262 min read

CONTEXT — Sahel Operating Environment | Week Ending 22 March 2026

SSCI Level: CRITICAL — Active Insurgency Expansion, Critical Minerals Under Pressure

The Sahel is not a future risk. It is an active crisis with direct corporate consequences today — and a critical minerals dimension that is now drawing in US, Chinese and Russian strategic interests simultaneously. The question for boards this week is not whether the Sahel is dangerous. It is whether your organisation has correctly mapped its exposure to the region's converging insurgent, governance and geopolitical vectors.

RISK

SECURITY — HARD DATA

JNIM (al-Qaeda affiliated) and ISSP (Islamic State Sahel Province) recorded 3,737 security incidents and 9,362 deaths across the Sahel in 2025. In March 2026, JNIM conducted coordinated attacks across eastern and northern Burkina Faso, killing at least 38 civilians. ISSP conducted an unprecedented attack on the international airport in Niamey — Niger's capital — marking a direct expansion into urban critical infrastructure. JNIM has maintained a siege of Bamako, cutting fuel supply routes and closing schools and universities. Both groups are now deploying armed drones systematically — Mali and Burkina Faso are the epicentre of militant drone usage in Africa, with JNIM expanding drone operations into western and southern Burkina Faso through 2025–2026.

CRITICAL MINERALS — THE STRATEGIC LAYER

This is what boards need to understand: the Sahel is sitting on one of the world's most strategically significant critical minerals concentrations — and everyone is moving to control it. Mali is projected to become Africa's second-largest lithium producer in 2026, with 890,000 tonnes of confirmed reserves. Niger holds 454,000 tonnes of uranium — 5% of global production. The region also hosts significant manganese, gold and cobalt deposits. In February 2026, senior US State Department officials visited Bamako and Niamey to reset bilateral relations and secure mineral access agreements under "Project Vault" — Washington's critical minerals strategic reserve. Chinese refining capacity controls nearly 70% of Sahel mineral processing. Russian Wagner-linked forces provide security to the military juntas. The minerals are real. The competition is real. The security environment makes extraction operationally viable only under very specific conditions.​

GOVERNANCE AND OPERATING FRAMEWORK

All three states — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger — are under military rule following coups, with no democratic transition timeline. Mali and Burkina Faso have dissolved all political parties. France has fully withdrawn. Wagner is the primary external security provider. The Iran war has disrupted previous Iranian security cooperation with AES states, creating a new security vacuum that Russia and the US are competing to fill. The Gulf energy price spike is directly transmitted into Sahel food and fuel inflation, as Mali and Niger are net energy importers — strengthening JNIM's economic warfare strategy of blocking fuel corridors.

IMPLICATION FOR ORGANISATIONS

The Sahel requires a bifurcated corporate posture: exit or constrained-hold for operational assets; early-positioning for post-conflict reconstruction and minerals governance. Three immediate priorities: (1) Extractives operators — reassess your security model: Wagner support creates both operational and sanctions/reputational exposure that most compliance frameworks have not yet absorbed. (2) Minerals strategy teams — the lithium and uranium opportunity is real but only accessible under a security framework that does not yet exist; monitor US-AES diplomatic normalisation as the trigger condition. (3) Logistics and NGO operators — JNIM corridor control is no longer rural; Bamako and Niamey are now active operational zones.


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Published by Jose Parejo & Associates, JPA Structural Analysis Unit | 20 March 2026
Classification: Executive Summary — Unrestricted Distribution

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